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Aristotle’s Voluntary/Deliberate Distinction, Double Effect and Ethical Relevance
Abstract: I articulate Aristotle’s account of the voluntary with a view to weighing in on a
contemporary ethical debate concerning the moral relevance of the intended/foreseen (i/f)
distinction. Natural lawyers employ the i/f distinction to contrast consequentially comparable
acts with different intentional structures. They propose that consequentially comparable acts of,
for example, terror and tactical bombing morally differ based on their diverse structures of
intention. Opponents of DER hold that one best captures the widely acknowledged intuitive
appeal of the distinction by contrasting agents, not acts. These thinkers hold that the terror
bomber differs from the tactical bomber while terror and tactical bombing do not differ ethically.
Aristotle’s accounts of the voluntary and the deliberately decided upon provide grounds for the
ethical relevance of the i/f distinction as applied to both acts and agents.

I.
The debate concerning the ethical relevance of the intended/foreseen distinction. G.E.M.
Anscombe inaugurated the ongoing debate concerning the ethical relevance of the
intended/foreseen (henceforth i/f) distinction as employed by natural lawyers in double-effect
reasoning (DER). Using DER, natural lawyers evaluate, e.g., terror bombing in which one
intentionally targets civilians as impermissible while regarding as permissible consequentially
comparable tactical bombing in which one foreseeably but without intent harms non-combatants
while targeting a military installation. The i/f distinction generates much of the dispute
concerning DER. With respect to the i/f distinction the disputants have paid attention – in
decreasing order – to three allied topics: first, the distinction between intent and foresight;
second, the application of the distinction to the disputed cases such as terror and tactical
bombing; and, third and finally, the moral significance, or lack thereof, of the distinction.1 This
third topic – relatively neglected considering its importance – occupies our interest in this paper.
In what follows I propose to address the resources provided by Aristotle in his account of the
voluntary – focusing on the Nicomachean Ethics – for the ethical import of the disputed
distinction.2
Before doing so, however, a question naturally arises. Namely, considering that DER
originates with Thomas Aquinas, why look to Aristotle for the moral relevance of a distinction
he himself neither makes nor employs?3 Indeed, Aquinas addresses the nature of intent at some
length while Aristotle – at least prima facie – does not employ the concept nor any obvious
analog. Moreover, Thomas contrasts intent from foresight while Aristotle – ultima facie – does
not indicate any concern for the question at issue. Is it not, at the very least, anachronistic and,
more objectionably, willful to look towards Aristotle’s account of the voluntary for the grounds
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of a distinction proposed by Aquinas some sixteen centuries subsequently? If this paper
succeeds, it will have answered this appropriately skeptical initial question. Allow me here to
propose that the i/f distinction instances a ramification of a more basic action-theory distinction
full of ethical import – namely, that made by Aristotle between the voluntary and the
deliberately decided upon. Attention to Aristotle’s distinction between the voluntary and the
decided upon shows the ethical import of the i/f distinction. Thus, I ask the doubting reader to
suspend disbelief in order to entertain the exercise with some hope that it may prove fruitful.
Before turning to Aristotle’s account, I will present the more salient contours of the current
debate concerning the ethical significance of the i/f distinction.
Few advocates of DER bother to articulate the moral relevance of the i/f distinction.4
Rather, given the widely recognized intuitive appeal of the distinction, most leave off argument
once they establish that, for example, the deaths of non-combatants in terror bombing are
intended while those in tactical bombing are foreseen but not intended.5 For many intuit it as
worse to intend to bring about a bad outcome than foreseeably to cause a comparable effect
concomitant with an intended good one seeks to effect. Accordingly, advocates of DER typically
do no more than establish the first two of the above-noted three disputed points. Namely, first,
they distinguish intent from foresight; and, second, they show that the impermissible act
incorporates intent while the permissible act does not. Of course, as opponents note, this is
inadequate for at least two reasons.
First, while those who quarrel with double effect acknowledge the widely recognized
intuitive basis for somehow distinguishing the intended from the foreseen but not intended
causing of a bad outcome, they do not think this is best captured by drawing an ethical contrast
between the relevant acts. Rather, (as will shortly become more evident) they think it best to
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locate the moral relevance of the i/f distinction in agent-assessment, not in act-evaluation.
Second, even if one were to concede that the i/f distinction does have ethical significance in actevaluation, why give it such great weight as to mark off the impermissible from the permissible?
Why not, rather, consider it as differentiating, for example, tactical from terror bombing as the
better from the less good act, both of which remain permissible? Of course, the first question
does come first. For if one misplaces the moral import of the i/f distinction in act-assessment
when it properly belongs in agent-assessment, then the point concerning the permissibility of
acts becomes moot. Accordingly, allow me to present the debate bearing on the first question,
the proper place of the ethical import of the i/f distinction. Given limitations of space, this topic
serves as my exclusive concern in this paper. This paper, however, does limn the outlines of a
response to the above-noted second question.
Contemporary opponents of DER – both thinkers sympathetic to consequentialism such
as Jonathan Bennett and deontologists such as Judith Jarvis Thomson and T. M. Scanlon –
propose that the natural lawyer errs, not in giving the i/f distinction moral weight, but in locating
its significance in act-evaluation.6 These thinkers claim, rather, that one more appropriately
places the ethical significance of the i/f distinction in agent-assessment. For example, the
deontologist J. J. Thomson proposes that locating the moral import of the i/f distinction in actassessment amounts to:
a failure to take seriously enough the fact – I think it is plainly a fact – that the question
whether it is morally permissible for a person to do a thing is just not the same as the
question whether the person who does it is thereby shown to be a bad person.7
Notably, Thomson and others who criticize DER assume without argument that the ethical
significance of the i/f distinction is found either in act- or agent-assessment, but certainly not in
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both. By contrast, the natural lawyer employing DER holds the i/f distinction to mark important
moral differences within both act and agent-assessment. That is, other things being equal, terror
bombing is impermissible and by that very act the terror bomber manifests a vicious character.
Conversely, tactical bombing is permissible and the tactical bomber does not, qua tactical
bomber, instantiate a vicious character. The opponents of DER such as Thomson and Scanlon
think they adequately account for the intuitive appeal of the i/f distinction if they locate its moral
import in agent-evaluation. The natural lawyer, of course, does not deny that the i/f distinction
has ethical relevance in agent-evaluation. Rather, he asserts that it has import in both fora.
Regardless, to respond to Thomson and allied thinkers such as Scanlon, one need show that the
i/f distinction does have moral import in act-evaluation. As I hope will become evident from a
close investigation of Aristotle’s accounts of the voluntary and the deliberately decided upon,
one finds ample grounds for its ethical import in act-evaluation. Accordingly, I first turn to
Aristotle’s account of the voluntary, as found in the Nicomachean Ethics. Relying upon the same
work, I will then address his discussion of deliberate decision.
II.
The voluntary, the not voluntary and the counter-voluntary. In Book III of the
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle begins his consideration of the voluntary and the
countervoluntary, as follows:
Now since virtue is concerned with feelings and actions [BDV>,4H], and praise and
blame come about for voluntary actions [X6@LF\@4H], but for counter-voluntary actions
[•6@LF\@4H] there is forgiveness and even pity, it is necessary for those who inquire
about virtue to distinguish the voluntary and the countervoluntary.8
To put his point more generally, given that the ethicist evaluates acts and agents, he does well to
4

have an account of agency or the voluntary. Before one attends to what makes an act (or agent)
good or bad, one must determine what makes an act an act (and an agent an agent). Namely, one
must present an account of the voluntary.
As logic itself dictates, Aristotle takes all happenings around humans to be either
voluntary [©6@bF4@<] or not voluntary [@ÛP ©6@bF4@H]. The not voluntary – @ÛP ©6@bF4@<
– has a number of subclasses: the natural such as growing old and dying (1135b1-2), the
necessary such as the solstices (1112a26), the fortuitous such as finding a treasure (1112a29),
and the countervoluntary [•6@bF4@H] such as the wind blowing sailors off course (1110a4).9 To
the countervoluntary belong acts (subsequently regretted) done either through ignorance [*4’

–(<@4<] or by force [$\‘].
Aristotle inquires into voluntary action beginning with an account of countervoluntary
[•6@bF4@H] occurrences. He does so because in human agency he understands voluntariness to
obtain unless excluded by countervoluntariness. As noted, countervoluntary happenings are so
either by force [$\‘] or through ignorance [*4’ –(<@4<] of the particulars of which an action
consists (1111a23-24). At the beginning of his inquiry into the countervoluntary (1110a41110b10), Aristotle considers actions done because of, “fear of greater evils” such as an action in
which an agent throws the cargo of a ship overboard in order, “to save himself and the others”
(1110a5). With such acts in mind, Aristotle distinguishes between what is forced conditionally
and what is forced unconditionally (and corresponding to these distinctions, what is
conditionally voluntary and what is unconditionally countervoluntary).
An action is conditionally forced when the circumstances in which the action occurs are
countervoluntary, yet the circumstances still permit the agent to act. The agent cannot be
characterized solely as a victim, but as a victim of circumstances in which he can and does act.
5

This conditionally forced action Aristotle calls “mixed”; it is “more like voluntary” action
(1110a12 and 1110b6). He says that:
an action is forced without qualification when its cause is external and the agent
contributes nothing. Other actions are countervoluntary in themselves, but now
choiceworthy and for these [goods], and their origin is in the agent (1110b3-5).
This distinction governs Aristotle’s discussion of the voluntary and the countervoluntary. He
concerns himself with the unconditionally voluntary and the unconditionally countervoluntary in
his definitions of both. (It would seem that the mixed act approximates the context within which
one relies on double effect. For example, both the terror and tactical bombers act voluntarily in
circumstances that are not themselves voluntary. Both their acts may be characterized as mixed;
done out of fear of greater evils. Accordingly, while notable, it does not serve to contrast the two
acts, or for that matter, the agents.)10
Putting mixed acts to the side, an unconditionally forced happening has an origin external
to the one forced, yet not external as a motive for or goal of action (as the sweetness of the
strawberries moves one to pick and eat them (1111a25-33)), but as exerting an agency which
affects and controls the individual from beginning to end as kidnappers blindfold, gag, and
handcuff a wealthy industrialist’s daughter and in so doing preclude her agency. We cannot
speak of her as the agent of the kidnaping, but as the victim. She effects nothing; rather, the
agency of others affects her (1110a2). If she were to assist her abductors in eluding the security
force guarding her residence, we would characterize her, not as the victim of a countervoluntary
occurrence, but as an agent of her own kidnaping. The one who suffers from force does so to the
extent to which she does not contribute to what comes about. Nor would we say that she were
abducted countervoluntarily if she found her kidnaping enjoyable: the victims of force
6

experience the actions affecting them with occurrent pain and subsequent regret (1110b12,
1110b19, 1111a22 and 1111a32). The girl must be handcuffed, gagged, and carried out of her
home because she resists being kidnaped and contributes nothing to an event which she presently
finds painful and subsequently worthy of regret. In an event countervoluntary by force, an
individual (most properly spoken of as a victim) suffers due to an external agency which causes
an outcome she regrets while neither contributing to nor desiring it.
Just as an event countervoluntary by force causes occurrent pain and subsequent regret,
so does what comes about countervoluntarily by ignorance. Regret characterizes the attitude of
the individual who suffers countervoluntarily. An agent does not bring something about
countervoluntarily by ignorance when she acts in her ignorance, but when she brings something
about in ignorance that she has not caused.11 Such blameless ignorance is of the particulars of
which an action consists. As in what is countervoluntary by force, the agent who brings
something regrettable about from blameless ignorance is spoken of as a victim of such
ignorance. Thus, countervoluntary occurrences result in a painful and regrettable consequence
and are caused either by force to which the agent does not contribute or by blameless ignorance
of the particulars of which the action consists. In both cases, the individual is a victim.12
With the countervoluntary adequately defined, Aristotle has all the elements in place to
define the voluntary. A voluntary action occurs neither by force nor by blameless ignorance, but
originates within the agent as the principal contributor to and source of the action the particulars
of which said agent knows. In contrast to the aforementioned causes comprising the not
voluntary – the natural, the necessary, the fortuitous, and the countervoluntary, Aristotle
classifies voluntary human action as in the category of what is “up to us” (¦N’ º:Ã<).13
Animals, children, and adult humans all have things that are up to them. Accordingly,
7

animals, children and mature humans act voluntarily. Thus, X6@bF4@H is said of adults,
children, and animals (1111a25 and 1111b8). Accordingly, after presenting his account of the
voluntary, Aristotle discusses decision [BD@\D,F4H] and deliberation [$@b8,LF4H],
themselves voluntary acts reserved to adult, mature humans.14 It is here, in a consideration of
Aristotle’s account of acts that, in addition to being voluntary, are also deliberated about and
decided upon that we see the grounds for ethically distinguishing acts incorporating the intention
of a bad effect from those including only foresight of the same. To that discussion, I now turn.
III
The voluntary, decision and deliberation. Having defined the voluntary, Aristotle goes on
to consider decision which, in turn, requires a discussion of deliberation. He does so, in part,
because, “decision seems to be most proper to virtue” (111b7). Indeed, readers will recall that
decision figures in the very definition of virtue found in Book II. There, virtue consists in a
deciding state [Z •D,J¬ ª>4H BD@4D,J46Z] (1103b21). Thus, in order fully to understand
virtue (and vice), one must understand decision [BD@\D,F4H].
In his initial consideration of decision, he proposes that:
Decision [BD@\D,F4H], then, is apparently voluntary, but not the same as what is
voluntary, which extends more widely. For children and the other animals share in what
is voluntary, but not in decision; and the actions we do on the spur of the moment are
said to be voluntary, but not to express decision.15
Here we see a distinction amongst voluntary acts. Some are simply voluntary; others, in addition
to being voluntary, have the added characteristic of being decided upon which, as we will see, in
turn, also implicates their being deliberate. Given that decision is voluntary, how may it be
further characterized?
8

In defining decision, Aristotle (characteristically) notes common opinions while finding
them deficient: 1) it is not desire, for irrational animals desire, but do not decide (1111b12); 2)
nor is it passion, for what we do from passion seems to be least decided upon (1111b19); 3)
although intimately related to wish – [º $@b8F\H], it is not wish, for wish concerns the
impossible while decision concerns what is up to us; finally, and for similar reasons, 4) neither is
it belief, for belief concerns, amongst other things, the eternal while decision, again, concerns
only what is up to us.
Manifestly, Aristotle asserts, decision is a voluntary act, but not every voluntary act is
decided upon (1112a15). He proposes that what differentiates decision from the simply
voluntary is its relation to deliberation [$@b8,LF4H]. As its name suggests [BD@ \D,F4H], it
is chosen before other things [BDÎ ©JXDT< ÊD,J`<] (1112a17). Aristotle sees this
etymology as intimating a relation to prior deliberation. Accordingly, he interprets “chosen
before” in the sense of “in preference to” and, therefore, after deliberation concerning what is
preferable to what (1112a17). That is, decision consists in that branch of voluntary action that
characteristically occurs after deliberation. Accordingly, Aristotle’s inquiry into decision
requires a discussion of deliberation.
Deliberation [$@b8,LF4H], like decision, is itself voluntary. It concerns what is up to us,
specifically, what is towards or for the ends we seek [Jä< BDÎH J* JX8] (1112b13, 1113a15),
not the ends themselves. Famously, Aristotle comments that a, “doctor does not deliberate about
healing, nor an orator about persuading, nor a statesman about making good legislation”
(1112b13-15). Duly noting that Aristotle consistently uses the phrase, “of those things towards
or for the end,” we may speak of deliberation as concerning the means in contrast to the end.
Deliberation is an inquiry or investigation [º .ZJF4H] (1112b24) that seeks to discover the
9

action originating from and controlled by us that best promotes the end we want. Discovering
such means via deliberation, we decide upon them and execute the contemplated act.
Accordingly, with his account of deliberation in place, Aristotle defines decision as,
“deliberative desire [$@L8,LJ46¬ ÐD,>4H] for (or about) what is up to us [Jä< ¦N º:Ã<]”
(1113a11). The resulting act is at once voluntary and deliberately decided upon. With this
account in place, let us turn to our ultimate quarry; namely, the ethical import of the distinction
between intent and foresight.
IV
The ethical relevance of the i/f distinction in Aristotelian terms. To name, as is
customary, the disputed distinction as one between intent and foresight is to suggest a contrast
between volitional and epistemic states, as if foresight of an outcome implies only that the agent
has a belief concerning the effect in question. One errs who so understands the difference at
issue. The i/f distinction does not differentiate the volitional from the epistemic. Rather, it
contrasts diverse volitional dispositions. Indeed, were the name not so well established, we
would probably best speak of the intended/voluntary distinction. For the agent knowingly and
willingly, in short, voluntarily effects the foreseen outcome in question. The foreseen outcome
does not figure, however, as a means towards the end the agent seeks. Accordingly, the agent
does not intend the foreseen effect. Nonetheless, the agent does have a volitional disposition
towards the effect. He wills it as a concomitant of what he does intend. Thus, for example, the
tactical bomber has a volitional disposition towards the terror and deaths of the civilians. He
wills them as concomitant effects of destroying the military installation. In conditions not
themselves voluntary, he voluntarily (knowingly and by his own agency, albeit not intentionally)
terrorizes, maims, and kills civilians.
10

As noted previously, Aristotle speaks of acting in such circumstances as a “mixed” act,
or a voluntary act performed in circumstances one would not choose. Similarly, the terror
bomber acts in mixed circumstances. For, presumably, just as, absent constraint, no one would
elect to bomb a military installation with civilians present, so, too, absent constraint, no one
would choose to terror bomb. As Aristotle says, apart from circumstances, “no one would choose
any such act for itself” (1110a19). Accordingly, terror and tactical bombing share the character
of being voluntary acts performed in circumstances themselves not voluntary. Thus, the acts do
not differ in this respect. Both instance the voluntary terrorizing, killing, and maiming of
civilians. How, then, do they differ?
They differ, not as the simply voluntary differs from the deliberate, but, rather, in terms
of which aspects of each act are deliberate. When one contrasts those simply voluntary aspects
of each act from its deliberate elements, one sees the ethical import of the i/f distinction by
which one ethically evaluates terror bombing as differing from tactical bombing.16
Consider the deliberate elements found in terror bombing. As uniformly presented in the
literature, one terror bombs in order to lower civilian morale, thereby undermine support for the
war, and, thereby, achieve victory. The terrorization of civilians serves as the proximate goal of
terror bombing. To terrorize civilians one deliberates about and decides upon means
proportioned to that end. So, for example, if one determines that incendiary bombs best maim,
kill, terrorize, and demoralize civilians, then one decides upon them as one’s means. Terror
bombing instantiates deliberately decided upon terrorization of harmless (innocent), noncombatants including infants, children, women, the elderly, the disabled, and the mentally
incompetent.
By contrast, picture the deliberate elements in tactical bombing. One has recourse to
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tactical bombing in order to destroy a military installation, and, thereby, advance the cause of
victory. The destruction of a military installation, say an artillery battery, serves as the proximate
goal of tactical bombing, So, for example, if one determines that incendiary bombs best destroy
the battery, then one decides upon them as one’s means. Tactical bombing instances the
deliberately decided upon destruction of a military target concomitantly harming the abovedescribed non-combatant populace.
As is customary in the debate concerning double effect and the i/f distinction waged
between, on the one hand, natural lawyers and, on the other, consequentialists and deontologists,
in contrasting terror and tactical bombing, one stipulates comparable consequences.
Accordingly, imagine the above acts of terror and tactical bombing as effecting comparable
consequences. Both do terrorize, kill and maim civilians (to the same extent and with the same
magnitude) while destroying the artillery battery. In turn, both do undermine support for the war
and impede the enemy’s military. Similarly, both do advance the cause of victory. Why, then,
contrast the two acts in question? Why not simply claim, as opponents of double effect and the
i/f distinction do claim, that while terror bombing does not differ from consequentially
comparable tactical bombing, the terror bomber is a worse agent than the tactical bomber and
leave it at that? Two responses come to mind. First, to do so is to employ superficial, inadequate,
indeed childish (in the sense of “fit for children, not adults”) criteria for act-evaluation. Second,
and more importantly, to do so is entirely to ignore the salient and multifarious viciousness of
terror bombing in contrast to the absence of the same in tactical bombing.
Allow me to frame the first charge of superficiality. As Aristotle’s account indicates,
amongst our acts we can readily contrast those that are simply voluntary (knowing-willing in the
sense of aware or conscious-willing), say the act of walking, and those that in addition to being
12

voluntary are deliberately decided upon, say the act of bicycling. Insofar as deliberately decided
upon acts more intimately and deeply involve wanting-thinking, they more fully instance a
human act (knowing-willing). They are more fully, more completely, more thoroughly human
acts. For this reason, they belong exclusively to adult, mature humans. For only such humans
robustly plan, order, and design their acts fully exercising their capacities as thinkers and willers.
While children and animals act voluntarily, only adult humans in their capacity as adult humans
act with deliberate decision, or complete, full thinking-willing. Accordingly, when we evaluate
deliberately decided upon acts, we must do so giving special prominence to those elements of
the act which render it deliberately decided. Otherwise, our assessments lack proportionality to
the object evaluated. That is, we would be evaluating an act as if it were merely voluntary and
not also decided upon deliberately. We would employ a standard fit only for a child’s or beast’s
act to an adult’s action. Moreover, and this brings me to my second above-enunciated claim, we
would fail to capture the most salient and important ethical difference between the acts of adults
and those of children and animals; namely, virtue and vice. For, as Aristotle says, decision best
instances virtue (and vice). Indeed, as the very definition of virtue indicates, deliberate decision
exemplifies the essence of virtue (and vice) [Z •D,J¬ ª>4H BD@4D,J46Z](1103b21).
With respect to vice, consider the acts of terror and tactical bombing. Indeed, terror
bombing is while tactical bombing is not, “murderous, bloody, savage, extreme, rude, cruel”
(Shakespeare, Sonnet 129. 3-4). Terror bombing targets the innocent, the harmless, those who do
not threaten (in nocere), the defense-less with a view to inflicting pain, suffering, despair and
terror upon them. Thereby, it is unjust, murderous and cowardly. It is unjust: for only the violent
merit violence; to render violence upon the harmless is unjust, for it is not due them. It is
murderous: purposefully to kill the innocent qua innocent, as terror bombing does, is to murder.
13

It is cowardly bullying: it targets the defenseless who do not threaten. It is savage, extreme, rude
and cruel: for it exemplifies the abandonment of that high civility by which the strong and
powerful direct lethal fury only upon those who might do likewise to them. Indeed, to call it
lupine is to insult the wolf who is better to wolf than man is to man in countenancing the various
vices exemplified in terror bombing.
By contrast, tactical bombing targets sources and agents of violence such as an artillery
installation and those who man it. Thereby, it is just. For violence is due the violent. Nor do the
deaths of the innocent render it murderous; for it does not instance the killing of the innocent as
innocent, but, rather, as proximate to the (just) violence it does instance. Nor need tactical
bombing incorporate cowardice, for a military target typically poses a threat to those who seek to
destroy it. Nor is tactical bombing barbarous, extreme, rude or cruel. For by it one does not seek
out civilians as targets and thereby betray a venerable achievement of civilization. Namely, that
by which the awful violence of war be directed against the violent, those who bear arms. Of
course, one would go too far were one not to note room for criticism of tactical bombing. It may
instance callousness, indifference to the suffering of others. Certainly, one would err if one were
positively to recommend it. For while it need not incorporate malice towards the noncombatants, it is certainly not a benevolent act; indeed, it does nothing but harm to them.
Nonetheless, as the i/f distinction illustrated in terms of Aristotle’s account of the voluntary and
the deliberately decided upon indicates, terror bombing necessarily exemplifies a variously
vicious (barbarous, murderous, unjust, and cowardly) deed while tactical bombing need not.
In conclusion, I propose that the i/f distinction does capture salient ethically relevant
differences between the acts considered by double effect. The distinction ramifies the contrast
between the voluntary and the deliberately decided upon. As recourse to Aristotle’s thought
14

indicates, the deliberately decided upon aspects of an act bear special significance in act- (and
agent-) evaluation insofar as they index both what is uniquely human and what is
(correspondingly) virtuous or vicious about the act. Ethicists who do not acknowledge the import
of the i/f distinction inevitably make immature, superficial, inadequate act-evaluations.
Moreover, they lack the resources by which to assess an act’s exemplification of virtue or vice. I
submit that the above serves as a response to those critics of the i/f distinction who do not grant
it ethical import in act-evaluation.
At the outset of this paper, I noted that in addition to showing that the distinction has
moral relevance in act-assessment (which I take myself to have done) one must also show that it
correctly marks the division between impermissible and permissible acts (which I do not take
myself to have adequately established). In pointing towards the latter task, I recall G. E. M.
Anscombe’s magisterial admonition:
[i]t would be a great improvement if, instead of “morally wrong,” one always names a
genus such as “untruthful,” “unchaste,” “unjust.” We should no longer ask whether doing
something was “wrong,” passing directly from some description of an action to this
notion; we should ask whether, e.g., it was unjust; and the answer would sometimes be
clear at once.17
I hope in the arguments I have presented above (although falling short of being, “clear at once”)
to have made some contribution towards that much-to-be-hoped for, “great improvement”.

15
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For a representative collection of articles on either side of the debate, see Paul Woodward, ed.,

The Doctrine of Double Effect: Philosophers Debate a Controversial Moral Principle (South
Bend IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001). For an extended consideration of double
effect, see T. A. Cavanaugh, Double-effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil (Oxford:
Clarendon, 2006).
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References to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics will be cited within the text with the Bekker

numbers. Unless otherwise noted, the translation is the author’s made with recourse to Terence
Irwin’s (Indianapolis IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1999) and H. Rackham’s (Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press, 1990). The Greek text employed is that found in Rackham.
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Historically, DER arises out of Aquinas’ accounts of natural law and human action. One finds

the locus classicus in Thomas’ Summa theologiae IIaIIae, q. 64, a.7. There, St. Thomas presents
double effect (albeit in inchoate form) while considering the natural-law licitness of a private
individual’s act of self-defense that results in the aggressor’s death.
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To consider one account of its relevance, see Cavanaugh, pp. 134-63.

5

Experiments attest to the widely held character of the intuition that intent has moral relevance in

act-assessment. Subjects differentiate consequentially comparable acts along lines similar to
double effect. For an extensive consideration of the experimental evidence, see, for example,
John Mikhail, Elements of Moral Cognition: Rawls’ Linguistic Analogy and the Cognitive
Science of Moral and Legal Judgment (New York NY: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
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See, e.g., Jonathan Bennett, The Act Itself (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), p. 225; Judith Jarvis

Thomson, “Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments,” Ethics 109 (1999): 497-518, at
517; and T.M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge MA:
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Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 58. Of these three, Bennett accords the i/f distinction the
least ethical significance even when limited only to agent-evaluation. He understands an agent
who foresees an upshot of his act without intending the same as conceptually capable of trying to
avoid that upshot, an option unavailable to the agent who intends the effect in question as a
means. Thus, Bennett thinks the agent who foresees without intent, “has a certain moral
advantage” over the agent who intends a consequentially comparable bad effect (Bennett, p.
225). Thomson and Scanlon grant the i/f distinction full moral import in agent-evaluation. They
hold, as does the natural lawyer, that the terror bomber, for example, is a vicious agent in virtue
of his intent to terrorize non-combatants. Of course, while the tactical bomber qua tactical
bomber can by no means thereby be deemed virtuous, neither can he thereby be evaluated as
vicious.
7

Thomson, p. 517. Scanlon concurs with Thomson regarding the natural lawyer’s error in placing

the ethical significance in act-evaluation. See Scanlon, pp. 21-4.
8

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, III, i., 1109b30-33. “Involuntary” is the common translation of

•6@bF4@H. “Countervoluntary”, proposed by Sarah Broadie (in Ethics with Aristotle (New York
NY: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 126) is preferable insofar as it more precisely reflects the
sense which Aristotle has in mind of •6@bF4@H as what goes against or counter to ©6@bF4@H.
9

Some find the example of growing old and dying jarring. Surely, this is countervoluntary?

Indeed, numerous translators and commentators find Aristotle’s proposal that growing old and
dying is neither voluntary nor counter-voluntary so clearly mistaken that they propose a corrupt
text, for no other reason but their certainty that one must counter-voluntarily grow old and die.
So, for example, we have Rackham saying, “‘Involuntary’ is certainly corrupt; perhaps Aristotle
wrote ‘in our control’”, (Rackham, p. 300, note a.). While it is true that most of us do not want to
17

grow old and die, simply not wanting some outcome does not make it countervoluntary. It must
also be under our control, up to us, the kind of thing that we can effect or affect. Insofar as
whether we grow old and die is not up to us, when we do so, we do so neither voluntarily nor
countervoluntarily. Of course, we might kill ourselves; would this not be a voluntary dying? No
doubt, such a dying would be voluntary; still, this does not render the dyings of those who do not
kill themselves up to us. Thus, growing old and dying is neither voluntary nor countervoluntary.
It is not voluntary. Both the voluntary and the countervoluntary share the underlying similarity
of being up to us and excluding what occurs naturally, fortuitously or necessarily.
10

For an extended treatment of the relation between Aristotle’s consideration of mixed acts and

double effect, see Michael Pakaluk, “Mixed Actions and Double Effect,” in Michael Pakaluk and
Giles Pearson, eds., Moral Psychology and Human Action in Aristotle (New York NY: Oxford
University Press, 2011), pp. 211-31.
11

In determining which types of ignorance cause actions to be countervoluntary by ignorance,

Aristotle excludes ignorance of which the agent is culpable as that of the drunk who acts in the
ignorance which she voluntarily caused by her drunkenness, and that of the agent ignorant of
what is actually virtuous or vicious for which ignorance the agent, as joint cause of her character,
is responsible.
12

Yet, what of something that occurs countervoluntary by ignorance that the agent does not

subsequently regret? Here, Aristotle proposes that the agent requires a distinct name, for he
differs from the agent involved in a countervoluntary act attended by regret. He calls
nonvoluntary [@ÛP ©6f<] the agent who through ignorance performs an act which he does not
find painful and subsequently regretful (1110b23). Aristotle clearly names the agent in contrast
to the act as distinct in this instance, saying “since he is different.” Putting that subtlety aside,
18

Irwin translates @ÛP ©6@bF4@< as “nonvoluntary” and @ÛP ©6f< as “nonwilling” (Irwin,
1110b18-23, p. 32). Rackham translates @ÛP ©6@bF4@< as “not voluntary” and @ÛP ©6f< as
“non-voluntary” (Rackham, 1110b18-23, p.123). I follow Rackham and translate @ÛP

©6@bF4@< as “not voluntary” and @ÛP ©6f< as “non-voluntary” in order to note that @ÛP
©6@bF4@< includes both actions countervoluntary by ignorance, •6@bF4@<, and actions which
are “not voluntary” by ignorance yet are not regretted; namely, @ÛP ©6f<.
Consider an example of the nonvoluntary, imagine a departmental barbeque hosted by
the Chair. Present at the barbeque is Nemesis who over the years has frustrated the Chair. The
Chair resents Nemesis, indeed, bears malice against him, wishing he were dead. Unbeknownst to
the Chair (indeed, even to Nemesis), Nemesis has a lethal allergy to swordfish which, as it turns
out, the Chair – due to his own delight in swordfish – has chosen to serve. As you, reader, no
doubt by now anticipate, Nemesis eats the fatal swordfish, goes into anaphylactic shock and dies.
The Chair has killed Nemesis through ignorance. Following Aristotle, we would consider this an
act countervoluntary by ignorance but for one thing: the Chair not only does not regret this
outcome and find it painful, he positively delights in it. For now his long years of frustration are
over. With Nemesis’ demise, all is possible, now those longed for hires may occur, those
graduate students of a certain stamp may be admitted, and so on. Clearly, Aristotle proposes, the
Chair requires a different name from the countervoluntary agent, for he differs. Accordingly, we
call him a nonvoluntary agent.
What ought we say of the act corresponding to the nonvoluntary agent? Is it to be spoken
of as countervoluntary by ignorance or as nonvoluntary? I would suggest that we speak of it as
nonvoluntary. For, paraphrasing Aristotle, it differs. The nonvoluntary category shows the, at
times, contingent relation between ignorance, on the one hand, and, on the other, pain and
19

subsequent regret. What of force; how does it relate to pain and regret? For example, could there
be an act countervoluntary by force that the agent does not find painful and regretful?
Presumably not, for the force suggests that the agent does currently find the act painful and will
subsequently find it regretful and, thus, must now be forced.
13

At 1112a31-33, Aristotle clearly identifies everything which operates through human agency

with what is “up to us” (¦N’ º:Ã<), what can be done by human agents. At 1113b 5-6, he
identifies what is “up to us” (¦N’ º:Ã<) with the voluntary (©6@bF4@H). In other passages (e.g.,
1135a24-27), Aristotle regards the voluntary and what is “up to us” as distinct: the voluntary is
what is “up to us” when the countervoluntary is excluded. Thus, Aristotle oscillates between
identifying ¦N’ º:Ã< with ©6@bF4@H and denoting it as one of the conditions of voluntary
action. By identifying what is “up to us” with what is voluntary, Aristotle notes the core
character of the voluntary; namely, ourselves as the primary source of agency. When Aristotle
distinguishes what is “up to us” from the voluntary, he does so to reiterate the exclusion of force
and ignorance from what is voluntary. “Up to us” excludes the not voluntary caused neither by
ignorance nor by force, but by nature (becoming hungry: 1113b28), necessity, or fortune (finding
a treasure: 1112a33). These are not voluntary, yet they do not vitiate voluntariness. Thus, it is
reasonable that Aristotle does not explicitly exclude them from the voluntary in his definition.
14

I translate BD@\D,F4H as “decision”; I do so because Aristotle clearly understands

BD@\D,F4H as depending upon and occurring after deliberation. To the extent to which
“decision” connotes a picking after deliberation while “choice” need not, the former remains
preferable.
15

N.E., 1111b7-10, Irwin’s translation.
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Of course, I assume that not all elements of a deliberately decided upon act are, thereby,
20

imbued with the character of being decided upon deliberately. I propose that, within a given
deliberate act one may distinguish its deliberate elements from its simply voluntary aspects. In
proposing to do this, I do not attribute such a move to Aristotle, except implicitly. For he, in his
discussion of the voluntary and the deliberate, explicitly contrasts only acts that are simply
voluntary (such as, for example, the adult human’s spontaneous act of spelling a word 1112b2)
on the one hand and deliberate acts on the other. I do think, however, that without violence to his
account of the voluntary and the deliberate, one may within an act incorporating decision discern
elements of it that are simply voluntary. For Aristotle clearly means us to understand acts as
deliberate and decided upon in terms of their incorporation of means ordered towards the wished
for end. Not all aspects of an act have this means-end character. Accordingly, I understand
myself as making explicit an implicit element in his account.
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G. E. M Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33 (1958): 1-19, pp. 8-9.
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